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Abstract—Sharing aggregated electronic health records (EHRs) 
for integrated health care and public health studies is increasingly 
demanded. Patient privacy demands that anonymisation 
procedures are in place for data sharing. However traditional 
methods such as k-anonymity and its derivations are often over-
generalizing resulting in lower data accuracy. To tackle this issue, 
we present the Semantic Linkage K-Anonymity (SLKA) approach 
supporting ongoing record linkages. We show how SLKA balances 
privacy and utility preservation through detecting risky 
combinations hidden in data releases.
Keywords—record linkage; privacy preservation; k-anonymity;
semantic technologies;
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic health records (EHRs) offer great opportunities 
for both healthcare and health research. Based on obtaining 
consent and ethical approvals, data custodians can share aspects 
of patient records for secondary use, e.g. in clinical trials and
studies. To meet the increasing research demands, record 
linkage techniques are often adopted to integrate EHRs 
associated with the same entity (e.g. a patient) where the data 
originates from potentially different organisations. Linkage can 
be used for many purposes, e.g. at the population level to 
correlate obesity and socio-economic status [1] or to predict lung 
cancer coverage based on mortality statistics [2], amongst many 
other scenarios. By leveraging linkage techniques, a 
comprehensive profile of patients and populations can be 
produced for many in-depth studies [3].
Over the last decade, numerous health data linkage units 
have been established across Australia [4][5][6]. Through 
probabilistic matching approaches, records obtained from 
remote organisations can be structured and standardised based 
on agreed information [7]. Depending on the kinds of 
identifying information, various algorithms can be used to 
compare attributes resulting in a vector of numeric similarities
[8][9]. With two thresholds (lower and upper thresholds) chosen 
for the matching step, record pairs are typically classified into 
three groups: Matched, Non-Matched and Possible Matched. To 
support highly accurate linkages, the “possible matched” group
requires manual reviews. Finally, the linkage unit needs to keep 
the mappings of records across different organisations. For 
instance, Fig. 1 shows a typical linkage between hospital A and 
pharmacy B. Initially, each organisation provides their raw data,
which is identified by pseudo names. Patient registered in both 
databases have more than one source identifier (SID), such as A-
01 and B-011 both pointing to Ashly who is uniquely identified 
as L-01 using a Master Linkage Key (MLK). To ensure the real-
time and sustainable management at the linkage unit, it is 
essential to generate the MLK in advance.
Figure 1. LinkageA-B generated between Hospital A and Pharmacy B.
Linkage generation should not result in re-identification of
individual patients. Therefore, a separation principle was
proposed and implemented in current linkage centres [11]. By
separating patient identifying data from actual health
information, it can restrict the access to and use of demographic 
information by researchers (users). This could well protect 
patient privacy, however limit the application in public health 
studies where the personal features are sometimes necessary to 
learn. Alternatively, using the ‘safe harbour’ protocol defined in 
the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) only a set of specific identifying attributes (social 
security number, name, driver license ID etc.) need to be 
removed from health datasets to ensure privacy [12]. However,
malicious users (attackers) can still narrow records to specific 
individuals based on combinations of key attributes. These key 
attributes are often called quasi-identifiers (QIs). For instance, it
has been shown that 87% of the US population can be re-
identified by combining such de-identified data sets [13]. To 
tackle this problem, a number of statistical disclosure control 
(SDC) approaches have been proposed to control the leakage 
chances to safer levels.
Typical SDC approaches including k-anonymity are defined
to generalise QI values against a numerical constraint, i.e. any 
individual represented in an equivalent group (class) must be 
indistinguishable from at least k-1 other individuals appearing in 
the same group [14]. In addition to identity protection,
anonymity models such as l-diversity and t-closeness have been
developed with emphasis on protecting sensitive attributes [15].
[16]. Furthermore, data published in distributed environments is 
also often protected using QI data sets [18] [19]. In addition to 
one-time request/disclosure scenarios, the composition attacks 






releases to seek out private information, i.e. in an on-going 
manner [20]. One solution is to keep sensitive attributes
unchanged within a timespan [21], e.g. the τ-safety scheme 
introduces the temporal concept ‘historical releases’ for risk 
analysis since a disclosure may occur based on changing
attribute combinations [22].
Although linkage jurisdictions achieve success in supporting 
health studies, there are challenges identified in governing 
linkage releases through the gradual erosion of privacy over time 
and the increased chances of potential re-identification. These 
should be considered and addressed while designing 
anonymising mechanisms for ongoing linkage release.
II. CHALLENGES OF LINKAGE DATA ANONYMISATION
A. Information Loss
Reducing information loss is critical when designing 
techniques for anonymisation of health data especially when the 
records contain both categorical data such as gender, geo-
location information and numerical data such as age in years, 
length of stay-in hospital etc. Dankar and El Eman (2012)
discussed the limitations of applying differential privacy 
methods to de-identify health information due to the addition of 
Laplace Noise to data that can cause significantly distorted
results [23]. Non-perturbation approaches such as k-anonymity
perform well based on the assumption that “end users may know 
patients who exist in the data set from all of their attributes”. 
However the optimisation of k-anonymity is proven to be an NP–
hard problem, hence weak k-anonymity was proposed for 
scenarios where the “presence” of individuals cannot be 
confirmed [24].
Problem scenario-1. Fig. 2 shows a linkage scenario1 where 
the linkage is anonymised by using k-anonymity (k=2), 
assuming requestors have viewed full (linkage) content.
However, this is not the case in many linkage applications where 
linkage is created and processed at trusted third party (TTP) sites.
To ensure protection of data based on local regulations, linked 
data should not be directly released to stakeholders. Instead of 
direct generalisation to all attributes, local knowledge (Hospital 
A or Pharmacy B) is needed to evaluate the anonymisation of
results. As shown in Fig. 3, the linkage released to Hospital A 
researchers is processed using weak 2-anonymity. For tuple 
<8/16/1974, 305*, Chinese>, two individuals (Ashly and 
Jessica) are possibly located at Hospital A and thus meet the 
privacy assumption, i.e. users should not be able to re-identify 
individuals from known entities if they are 2-anonymised. With
fewer QI attributes being generalised, the weak k-anonymity
model outperforms standard k-anonymity in terms of preserving 
the utility of linked data. As adversaries are unsure of the given 
presence of the target in a dataset a less-transformed (obfuscated) 
linkage set can be retained and thus be of greater value for 
secondary use. 
                                                          
1 In this and the following examples we assume demographic attributes such 
as date of birth, sex, age, ethnicity and language etc. are QI attributes defined 
by local custodians.
Figure 2. Generalising linkage with k-anonymity (k=2).
Figure 3. Generalising linkage with weak k-anonymity (k=2).
B. Inference disclosure 
Regardless of background knowledge, privacy leakage can
still happen due to inferences of the data based on knowledge 
and associated standards. To tackle these issues, SEMANTIC
TECHNOLOGIES have been applied in various contexts where 
privacy risks need to be considered and minimised. THROUGH
knowledge modelled in the web ontology language (OWL) and 
semantic web rule language (SWRL) rules, policies formalised 
with semantic meaning can be used to reason about “next-stage” 
measures based on current conditions [34]. As one example of 
this, Paci AND ZANNONE (2015) OFFERed an improved access 
control approach to medical datasets based on use of SNOMED 
CT - the ontology-structured health terminology [25][35].
Semantically, if access to patients with a value of “Cancer” in 
the Disease field is restricted, access to other patients with
related (subtype) diseases should also be restricted. Through 
identifying the associated variables and sensitive values, 
distribution attacks can BE DETECTED WHILE GENERALIsing 
micro-data to safe LEVELS USING SDC PRINCIPLES [39][40][41].
For instance, it is suggested to remove the ancestor-descendant
dependencies from anonymised datasets. Related hEALTH 
PROBLEMS CAN BE organised with dependencies between 
individual clinical concepts, E.G. CERTAIN INFECTIOUS AND 
PARASITIC DISEASES [A00-B99] are an ancestor term to VIRAL 
Hepatitis [B15-B19] based on an inclusive relationship [37][38].
To tackle homogeneous attacks on sensitive attributes, Wang et 
al. (2013) proposed the (k, ε)-anonymity mechanism to maintain 
the distinctiveness of sensitive attributes within each equivalent 
class [36], e.g. {Diabetes} can be associated with {Type-1
Diabetes} or {Type-2 Diabetes}.
In addition to explicit associations provided in given 
vocabularies, it is also necessary to look for implicit association
rules from linked datasets. The risk of re-identification increases 
as researchers collect and combine data with other ‘co-

relations’, e.g. using demographic features such as job, 
language, ethnicity, living suburbs etc. This may however result 
in privacy breaches. Through measuring the values shared by the 
same individuals, association rules can be identified in the 
linkage. Existing methods on this topic mainly relies on 
association rule mining, which focuses on transaction records 
with 0/1 values related to the item appearance [32]. Furthermore, 
numerical factors support and confidence can be calculated to 
represent the item significance as well as the association 
strength in the current linkage set.
Problem scenario-2. Detecting association leakages from
data linkage release is challenging for many real-world linkages 
since they can be arbitrarily constructed in an ad hoc fashion by
combining datasets. Furthermore, candidate datasets can be 
updated periodically. An example scenario of such a situation is
demonstrated in Fig. 4. As discussed, weak k-anonymity offers a 
better model to protect datasets against local users and thus the 
identifier Language in Pharmacy B does not initially help users 
in Hospital A in re-identifying the linked records. As shown in 
Fig. 4 a), an anonymised linkage set can be generated under the 
weak 3-anonymity model. Based on such a result, it is common 
to learn associated factors in public health research. For instance, 
it is not difficult to discover the implicit association Mandarin 
ė Chinese from anonymous releases between Ethnicity and 
Language variables. Theoretically, such associations would not 
directly breach the privacy protection in a single one-time 
release however they could weaken the anonymization over 
time. As shown in Fig. 4 b),  suppose the same user (role) wishes 
to initiate a linkage between A and B after collecting the 
Language information as the fourth QI attribute. The Hospital A 
aggregated values in the column Ethnicity can then be utilised 
by adversaries to breach the pre-agreed scheme through refining 
the 3-anonymity item, <1960-1980,*, Asian, Mandarin> in a 2-
anonymity item such as <1960-1980,*,Chinese, Mandarin>. A 
key challenge in this context is the dynamic nature of such 
violations. Ideally manual review should be minimised, yet 
any/all policies from all autonomous stakeholders should be 
checked for their overarching, integrated anonymity 
requirements.
As stated, individual privacy and the resultant data quality 
preservation are critical factors in designing SDC techniques. 
The privacy of individuals can be preserved at the cost of data 
utility [26]. Therefore, information loss is a crucial part of 
optimal anonymity approaches [27]. Previously, we identified 
the privacy risks by applying optimised SDC methods on record 
linkage and demonstrated how semantic technology can help 
mitigating the issue [28]. In this paper, we design the Semantic 
Linkage K-Anonymity (SLKA) method for anonymising record 
linkage data, balancing the privacy, data utility as well as 
associated risk analysis. Building on the eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) framework, we extend 
the anonymity schemes and obliged components for de-
identification and privacy verification (potentially). As personal 
attributes can be freely integrated or extended locally, semantic 
implications and skewed distributions in attribute combination 
may threaten patient privacy. In this work, associations mined 
from “history publications” are extended and later enforced on 
                                                          
the transformed linkage. More importantly, instead of focusing 
on simply protecting access to and use of sensitive attributes [17], 
this work effectively limits the chance of re-identification to an
acceptable level and shows how semantic reasoning can deliver 
protection over real-time schemes and verify attributes based on 
the ever-growing external knowledge of collaborators and 
indeed potentially adversaries. To the best of our knowledge, no 
existing solutions have been designed for repeated linkage 2
which can be demanded in the long-term health studies [51].
Considering the sensitive data and the data privacy erosion 
challenges they give rise to; this work can fill the gap.
a) Linkage anonymised at Time N
b) Linkage anonymised at Time N+1
Figure 4. Ongoing release of linkage A-B by weak 3-anonymized.
III. METHOD
Most statistical disclosure control practices are based on 
tabular data recognition and categorising sensitive information 
including sequence identifiers (SID) and quasi-identifiers (QI)
[42]. To preserve patient privacy while reducing unnecessary 
transformations, we design a semantic-based linkage k-
anonymity (SLKA) framework with dynamic risk detection and 
prevention using semantic reasoning related to the potential 
risks associated with these identifiers. We introduce the basic 
mathematical models associated with these concepts.
A. Basic Concepts
DEFINITION-1 (OVERLAPPING POPULATION). In the 
context of record linkage between two data resources X and Y,
an overlapping population (OPX-Y) refers to a group of common 

individuals (CIX-Y) in both datasets, where the resources 
themselves may be maintained by different organisations.
A partial injection relation typically exists between EHR
linkage and local datasets. For instance, Fig. 1 shows patients 
identified by A01, A02, A03 and A04 in Hospital A dataset that 
may match with another dataset containing B011, B021, B031
and B041 in the Pharmacy B dataset. In this case, only two pairs 
of records are matched to the same individuals, i.e. (A01, B011)
and (A04, B041) Therefore, the OPA-B consists of the common 
individuals (CIA-B) uniquely identified in the linkage set, i.e. L-
01 and L-02 respectively. In other words, OPA-B refers to the 
intersection of the independent databases and thus it can be 
constructed as a subset of the member databases, expressed as
CIA-B = LRA∩ LRB.
In case the presence of an individual can be inferred, data 
custodians may have the anonymity model switched from k-
anonymity to weak k-anonymity by computing the overlapping 
rate (OR), which is given as ORX-Y = |OPX-Y||LRX| or ORY-X =
|OPX-Y|
|LRY| . In 
the example of Fig. 3, a policy can be defined in Hospital A such 
as weak k-anonymity which can be used if ORA-B is within the 
safe range say (0, 0.7); otherwise k-anonymity should be used 
since there is an increased chance for adversaries to infer the 
patient presence. On this basis, weak 2-anonymity gives a 50% 
chance of re-identification and can be applied to protect the 
record linkage.
DEFINITION-2 (ANONYMITY SCHEME). Locally, data 
privacy is preserved based on an anonymity scheme (AS), 
including the quasi-identifier set and the numerical requirements
given as ASx= <QIx, kx>.
As shown in the Fig. 3, anonymity schemes are defined in 
both datasets as ASA = <QIA = {Date of Birth, Zip, Ethnicity}, kA
= 2> and ASB = <QIB = {Date of Birth, Sex}, kB =2>. These 
schemes can be used for privacy protection for either local 
access (dataset A or dataset B) or remote linkage (linkage A-B)
DEFINITION-3 (LOCAL RELEASE). Local release (LR) 
refers to the local records disclosed to users who are authorised 
to access them. The data subjects in LRX (or LRY) are called local 
individuals (LIXi or LIYj) and the QIX or QIY attributes are
generalised according to given local anonymity schemes ASX or 
ASY.
As shown in Fig. 3, the generalised dataset about Hospital A 
refers to a local release of linkageA-B, i.e. the individuals included
in LRA. Based on the defined scheme ASA, the details of LIAi are 
generalised and can be used for replacing linkage values during 
anonymisation.
DEFINITION-4 (DOMINANT AND SUBORDINATE 
DATABASE). In the context of sharing linkageX-Y, there must 
be databases from which users use when initiating linkages.
These databases are called dominant databases; otherwise they 
are regarded as subordinate databases in terms of the linkage.
Returning to the example in Fig. 4, dominant databases are 
given along with the linkage requests from Hospital A.
Therefore, the database in Hospital A is the dominant database 
and its anonymity scheme ASA = <QIA = {Date of Birth, Zip, 
Ethnicity}, kA=2> is the dominant anonymity scheme. Given 
the hypothesis that any adversary can have background 
knowledge only from the local release, the anonymity scheme 
ASA will instigate the on-going linkage anonymisation and 
release. 
The access rights of subordinate databases are not 
necessarily granted to users at the beginning of a linkage, e.g. 
when no trust exists, however this may be achieved over time. 
This requirement must adhere to all lawful regulations on health 
data confidentiality, e.g. protected health data should only be 
disclosed to authorised users [42].
DEFINITION-5 (LINKAGE K-ANONYMITY): Record
linkage LinkageX-Y satisfies a given anonymity requirement if,
for each common individual in OPX-Y there are at least kX-Y
matching tuples in the local release LRX (or LRY).
As with access rights in authorisation decisions, anonymity 
requirements for each linkage applications are produced by 
composing all independent anonymity policies of the relevant 
datasets. Suppose the numerical requirements enforced on 
record linkage should not be less than the associated 
requirements of any participating dataset resources so as to 
satisfy all statistical requirements. For instance, the numerical
requirement for LinkageA-B can be achieved by selecting the 
maximal k, e.g. kA-B = max (kA, kB) = 2 (both A and B are 
required with a minimum of 50% risk).
DEFINITION-6 (LINKAGE QUASI-IDENTIFIER) In the 
context of linking datasets X and Y , the linkage quasi-identifiers 
LQIX-Y are equal to the dominant current anonymity scheme (e.g. 
QIX). The non-quasi-identifiers (NQIX-Y) are quasi-identifiers 
that only belong to the subordinate databases.
Distinguishing the LQIs from all candidates can help reduce 
unnecessary generalisation and preserve linkage utility. For 
instance, with the dominant database in Hospital A, the non-
quasi-identifiers NQIA-B refers to the QI attributes of Pharmacy 
B only, i.e. NQIA-B = {qi| qi ϵ QIB \QIA}. According to Definition 
4, NQIA-B will not help (Hospital A) staff to re-identify common 
individuals and therefore they need not be generalised. 
DEFINITION-7 (GENERALISATION): In the context of 
anonymising linkageX-Y, the LQI attributes need to be
generalised as GV[QIX-Y] until all tuples involving common 
individuals T[CIX-Y] can meet the numerical criteria kX-Y.
Generalised tuples reflect privacy realisations. It is noted that 
for categorical attributes in the set QIA-B, the generalised values 
(GV) on n-level hierarchies can often be established, i.e. 
GnVm[qiA-B]. For instance, a subtree G5(3000) [Zip] can be 
established for the postcode 3000, comprised of 3000, 300*, 
30**, 3*** and ****. In addition, certain pre-processing is often 
demanded for numerical attributes, e.g. based on ad-hoc integer 
ranges.
DEFINITION-8 (COMPOSITION ATTACKS): 
Composition attacks occur when linkage tuples involving 
common individuals CIX-Y are found to be matching with less 
than kX (or kY) local individuals LIX (or LIY) in the dominant 
database.
Linkage publication may lead to privacy leakage when 
adversaries acquire auxiliary information from previous linkage 
releases. As shown in Fig. 4 a), the association Mandarin → 
Chinese can be learned from previous releases that help local 

users to refine the generalised items and then potentially breach 
the privacy requirement (1/3 → 1/2). To maintain privacy 
protection levels, verification is required against previous 
associations and local knowledge.
DEFINITION-9 (RELATED VALUE): Related values are 
based on record linkage releases, denoted as RVX-Y(Vm, Vn)
where{Vm →r Vn| →r ∈ R}.
In addition to the explicit relations among categorical 
attributes such as isAncestor (↑), isDescendent (↓),
equivalentWith (→eq) within or across hierarchies, the relation 
set R also includes implicit relations (→ir) that may exist among 
attributes as condition and consequence elements. For instance, 
related values such as RVA-B(Mandarin, Chinese) give rise to
privacy issues by specialising the protected value Asian as 
Chinese in Fig. 4 b). Therefore, we establish a generic workflow 
through which associations between non-quasi-identifiers
(NQIs) and protected QI attributes can be established. As noted,
the NQIs are not generalised. Therefore, rule mining starts with 
their unit values (level n) and aggregated values of QIs, e.g. RVA-
B(Mandarin, Female), given that only full associations can 
threaten patient privacy. To protect the release from privacy 
breaches, such associations will be added into the knowledge 
base as the basis for privacy verification, i.e. conditional values 
occurring in future releases need to be generalised until no 
protected elements can be specialised. 
Speciality in the linkage or local datasets is unpredictable. 
For instance, if the mandarin speakers are the only Asian
language speakers in the current linkage set, then it is not enough 
to verify the release with one associations formed as “Mandarin
→ X”. In addition, the ancestor “Asian_Language → X” should 
be added to the knowledge base, too. In other words, values with 
one-step generalisation could still narrow the equivalence 
groups to the “less-than-k” form. As a result, it is necessary to 
continue the mining of conditional items with one-level reduced 
and then include resultant associations in an accumulative 
process. As shown in Fig. 5, after mining the anonymised 
records, all conditional identifiers should be analysed from their 
highest levels in the association rule set, i.e. for each identifier, 
more associations can be established by reducing details 
gradually. This process will terminate at level 0 and then start 
for another identifier. For instance, Language is a NQI at Time 
N and the unit values are available (level 4). With the initial k-
anonymised result, all language values can be processed through 
3 other rounds. 
DEFINITION-10 (RISKY INDIVIDUAL): Individuals in
overlapping populations may suffer from composition attacks if
matching records can be found from the local releases where the 
number is less than kX-Y.
Associations identified in ongoing linkage applications may 
allow adversaries to obtain specialised information. As a result, 
the anonymisation for a set of individuals may be eroded and 
eventually violated over time, even though they were 
anonymised and met all required (known) statistical data risk 
disclosure demands at the current time point. For instance, the 
anonymised 3-anonymised linkageA-B in Fig. 4 is refined into 2-
anonymised linkage due to the association mined from the 
previous release.
Figure 5. Accumulative association mining among attributes (Time N).
B. Semantic based Policy Specification
1) XACML-based Acccess Frameork
Leveraging an existing solution [17] where XACML policy 
components are expressed and used for semantic reasoning in 
supporting access control policy compliance and privacy 
protection, we formalise anonymity schemes within obligation 
components so that the semantic-based anonymisation can be 
enforced when evaluating linkage requests and releases. Fig. 6
shows an extended XACML framework where the access to 
record linkage can be managed in a distributed environment. 
This architecture consists of components such as Policy 
Administration Points (PAPs), Policy Information Points (PIPs), 
Policy Decision Points (PDPs) and Policy Enforcement Points 
(PEPs). Initial policies written in PAPs are made available to 
PDPs. These policies represent the restrictions related to use of
certain resources (data and services). In a given XACML policy 
evaluation, it is possible that PDPs require more attributes 
(credentials) from PIPs, e.g. related to the user’s credentials and
trustworthiness. The resultant suggestions are returned to PEPs, 
which then permit or deny access requests to potentially fulfil 
obligations. Specific to the data linkage case, the requester sends 
a linkage request to the central PEP (step 1) and it passes a 
XML-formatted request to the PDP for specific requirements 
(step 2). The PDP firstly retrieves policies from the local PAP 
(step 3), to which the original policies are transferred from the 
remote PAPs (step 4). Through semantic reasoning of the related
information, the linkage anonymity scheme can be produced at 
the central PAP (step 5). At this point, the PIP may be requested 
to disclose attributes stored centrally and/or remotely.
According to the decisions made by the PDP, the actual values 
are pulled from local datasets (step 6) and the generated 
obligations are enforced by PEPs (step 7). This semantically-
extended XACML framework forms the foundation for
protected linkages using reasoning capabilities.
Mining associations from anonymised result
Ouput
(n= n-1) ≤ 0 N
Y
Extending knowledge base with 
associations formed as NQI → LQI for 
privacy verification to future release
Generalising the
conditional NQI
attributes by one level

Figure 6. Record linkage access control in SLKA-extended framework.
2) Semantic-based Privacy-preserving XACML
Table I shows generic concepts of the XACML framework 
(Request, Obligation and Target) and the extended 
anonymising method (e.g. Anonymity, RiskAnalysis etc.).
Along with the linkage request, a linkage anonymity scheme 
needs to be constructed. According to Definition 2, related 
Anonymity schemes include the QI attributes and numerical 
requirement k pre-defined to the datasets. From the candidate 
databases, e. g. DBA and DBB, it is possible to determine what
anonymity requirements need to be considered. As defined in 
Rule 1, the ASA-B will be enriched with results such as 
hasAnonymity(LSA-B, AnoA) and hasAnonymity(LSA-B, AnoA).
1. Request(?req), hasResource(?req, ?ls), linkFrom(?ls, ?db), 
hasAnonymity(?db, ?ano) ė hasAnonymity(?ls, ?ano)























As discussed, linkage anonymisation depends on the local 
releases and dominant anonymity schemes. Based on 
Definitions 3-4, databases that users (or roles) are authorized to 
access will dominate the linkage anonymity. Correspondingly, 
Rule 2 is used to find the relation between credentials and local 
anonymity schemes via enforceAnoReq(Clinician, AnoA). Based 
on the result, Rule 3 can be used to derive the possible LQI
attributes in the linkage, e.g. hasLinkageQI(LSA-B, Gender) from 
                                                          3 Attributes related to linkage instances via hasQI are not the QI attributes to be 
generalised for the linkage. In fact, the actual linkage QI attributes need to be confirmed 
by reasoning on rules 1-3.
the QI attributes in the related databases such as hasQI(AnoA,
Gender)3. According to Definitions 4-5, non-QI attributes are 
not helpful to re-identify patients from record linkage as long as 
linkage k-anonymity holds. In this case, user knowledge is 
assumed to be consistent with the home sites where they 
authenticated.
2. Request(?req), hasSubject(?req, ?role), hasResource(?req, ?ls), 
hasAnonymity(?db, ?ano), linkFrom(?ls, ?db), authenticatedWith(?role, ?db) 
→ enforceAnoReq(?ano, ?role)
3. Request(?req), hasSubject(?req, ?role), enforceAnoReq(?ano, ?role), 
hasResource(?req, ?ls), hasQI(?ano, ?qi) →hasLinkageQI(?ls, ?qi)
Numeric requirements on the linkage LSA-B can be selected
through reasoning using Rules 4-5. According to Definition 5,
after comparing all related values such as hasAnoReq(LSA-B, 2),
a composite requirement can be achieved and used in the 
hasLinkageAnoReq(LSA-B, 2) for linkage anonymisation.
4. LinkageScheme(?ls), hasAnonymity(?ls, ?ano), hasAnoReq(?ano, ?n) → 
hasAnoReq(?ls, ?n)
5. LinkageScheme(?ls), hasAnoReq(?ls, ?n1), hasAnoReq(?ls, ?n2), 
greaterThan(?n1, ?n2) → hasLinkageAnoReq(?ls, ?n1)
3) Privacy Verification
In addition to tracing anonymity schemes, requests are also 
used to locate the authorisation and obligation rules to be 
executed. In Fig. 4, linkageA-B demands access privileges exist 
for DBA and DBB. If this can be confirmed by Rule 2, the 
anonymisation will be conducted based on the scheme given 
previously. As Table I shows, Obligation rules can be specified 
using objects with particular functions. For instance, the 
obligation (Ob1) can be defined to enforce the inferred
anonymity from target subject (e.g. Clinician) onto resource (e.g.  
linkageA-B). Semantically, this can be formalised as 
hasTarget(Ob1, Tar1) and hasSubject(Tar1, Clinician). Given 
the reasoned anonymity scheme enforceAnoReq(Clinician,
AnoA), Rule 6 is reasoned to enforce the scheme for target 
linkage via enforceAnonymity.
6. Obligation(?o), hasTarget(?o, ?tar), hasSubject(?tar, ?role), 
enforceAnoReq(?ano, ?role) → enforceAnonymity(?o, ?ano)
However, it may not be sufficient to protect the on-going 
linkage from associated attributes. For this reason, the linkage
instances should be attached with all associations mined from 
their “previous releases” as well as the processing functions. 
Together these are classified as RiskAnalysis, such as the 
generic instance RAAB representing all associations about the 
linkageA-B cohort. Specially, concrete value pairs mined from
each release should be added to the user (role), such as 
hasRA(Clinician, RAAB-1), hasRA(linkageA-B, RAAB) and 
isA(RAAB-1, RAAB) during the Time N release. Back to the 
example in the Figure 4, the association Mandarin → Chinese
found at Time N can be formalised as RA instances with
condition and consequence items. Formally, RAAB-1 can be 
expressed with hasConditionAttr(RAAB-1, Mandarin) and
hasConsequenceAttr(RAAB-1, Chinese), implying the consequent 
and antecedent attributes of the 2-ary relations. During the 
accumulative rules mining for each release of certain linkage,
associations may establish after generalising the condition item 
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in the RA instances, such as Asian_Language  → Chinese from 
Mandarin → Chinese. In this case, they can be added to the 
original associations via hasSubRA, e.g. hasSubRA(RAAB-1,
SRAAB-1) while the formalisation of SRAAB-1 is identical to RA 
instances.
To mitigate the risk hiding in Tuples (the records of linkage 
sets) , it is necessary to replace antecedent values with generic 
forms whenever their generalised consequent values can be 
refined and subsequently weaken the privacy effect. In other 
words, contained attribute ought to be checked in the 
combination form. For this purpose, Rule 7 is defined to locate
the associations that are necessary to be used to protect current
release. As stated, knowledge (associations) learned in the 
previous releases are related to role names. Supposing a clinician 
at Hospital A viewed the linkageA-B at Time N, he/she can be
assumed knowing the associations (such as RAAB-1) about the 
population in linkageA-B. As long as the type can be confirmed
via isA, concrete analysis can be enforced through the
Obligation, e.g. enforceRA(Ob1, RAAB-1). The aim of filtering
out associations from RAAB based on the role name is to mitigate 
the unnecessary data transformation while preserving privacy.
7. Obligation(?o), hasTarget(?o, ?t), hasSubject(?o, ?r), hasRA(?r, ?ra1), 
hasResource(?t, ?ls), hasRA(?ls,?ra2), isA(?ra1,?ra2) ė
enforceRA(?o, ?ra1)
To check and process risky individuals (tuples), Rule 8-9 are 
defined with reasoned associations by conducting the designate
Functions (e.g. Generalisation based on generalising current 
values by “one step”) to the “current release” of the same linkage 
schemes. Within the knowledge base, hierarchies in categorical 
attributes can be specified such as hasAncestor(Mandarin,
Asian_Language). Besides, anonymised tuples such as <1960-
1980, * , Asian, Mandarin> in the Time N+1 release can be 
specified with hasAttribute(Tup1, Mandarin) and 
hasAttribute(Tup1, Chinese), as well as the pre-defined function 
via hasFunction(RAAB-1, Generalisation). Once detecting the
risky attributes in tuples, pre-defined functions can be suggested 
to the compromised values (e.g. Mandarin) via 
enforce(Generalisation, Mandarin).
After finishing this check, a temporary tuple will be created. 
Potentially, Rule 9 is defined to search (potentially) more RA 
cases along with the predicate hasSubRA to test if there is a risk 
from the ancestor value. According to the definition, if there is 
one attached to active RiskAnalysis instances then the tuple 
cannot be released. It has to be verified against all related cases 
e.g. enforce(Generalisation, Asian_Language).
8. Obligation(?o), enforceRA(?o, ?ra), hasFunction(?ra, ?fun), 
hasConditionAttr(?ra, ?a2), hasConsequenceAttr(?ra, ?a1), 
hasAncestor(?a1, ?a_1), Tuple(?tup), hasAttribute(?tup, ?a2), 
hasAttribute(?tup, ?a_1)→ enforce(?fun, ?a2)
9. Obligation(?o), enforceRA(?o, ?ra), hasSubRA(?ra, ?sra), 
hasFunction(?sra, ?fun), hasConditionAttr(?sra, ?a2), 
hasConsequenceAttr(?sra, ?a1), hasAncestor(?a1, ?a_1), Tuple(?tup), 
hasAttribute(?tup, ?a2), hasAttribute(?tup, ?a_1)→ enforce(?fun, ?a2)
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
A. Experiment Design
To analyse the performance of the SLKA model, we consider 
a linkage scenario where data can be linked, anonymised and 
verified at a linkage centre. In this study, we utilised data sources
from a health survey dataset related to residents in Victoria, 
Australia. To understand the population health, the Department 
of Health in Victoria periodically undertakes a survey involving 
25,000+ Victorians to assess their overall health and lifestyle 
considering a variety of factors covering work-life balance, 
discrimination and domestic violence, drinking and smoking 
habits and basic demographics [43].
To reflect real-world linkage applications, such survey data 
can be used to support research by linking with other clinical 
data. As one example, the Australian Diabetes Data Network
(ADDN) includes information on over 13,000 patients with 
Type-1 and Type-2 diabetes [44]. In this experiment, we 
consider linkage between ADDN and VicHealth to explore the 
impact of alcohol consumption on diabetes. To compare the 
performances of different anonymizations, we sampled 1000 
records from the VicHealth survey results while assuming there
were overlapping populations in both data resources.
As shown in Table II, attribute details such as the data types, 
the value distribution as well as the hierarchical structure are 
listed. Prior to data linkage, repositories submit their data
dictionaries to linkage centres leveraging (wherever possible) 
standardised sources. Similar to the categorical attributes, 
numeric variables are aggregated based on ad-hoc schemes for 
transformation. Fig. 7 shows a fragment of the data dictionary:
the ‘Age’ values are processed into intervals, such as 0-4, 5-9
etc. in Fig. 7 a); standard taxonomies of geo-locations (e.g. 
postcodes, statistical area levels etc.) and demographics (e.g. 
languages, ethnicities etc.) are organised in Fig. 7 b) and Fig. 7
c) [29][33][45][46]. Based on such a hierarchical structure, the
specificity of values can be quantified through attaching “0, 1/3, 
2/3, 1” to a 4-level classification scheme where “1” stands for 
the raw units (e.g. 3205-Greek) while “0” for empty cells [47]. 
In addition, to serve the multi-level association mining, values 
in the data dictionary are tagged with the level number, e.g. 
“Level_0”, “Level_4” etc.










Gender 3 2 Categorical 
Ethnicity 45 4 Categorical
Postcode 320 5 Categorical
VicHealth
Age 87 (15 groups) 5 Numerical
Language* 36 4 Categorical
SA1 code 704 5 Categorical
*{Language} is the dynamic attribute changing over time.
a) 5-year age hierarchy
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b) Postcode and SA code
c) Ethnicity and Language
Figure 7. Attribute variable hierarchies.
B. SLKA Implementation
To realise semantic privacy-oriented linkages for repeated 
linkage, we developed a prototype using Protégé 4.0 to show 
how semantic reasoning can dynamically inform the linkage k-
anonymity with reasoning capabilities. Based on the above facts 
and semantic Rules 1-9 the working mechanism of SLKA can be 
demonstrated through a linkage scenario. Initially users request 
to view the linkage from ADDN. On this basis, policy 
requirements on linkage sets can be generated through semantic 
reasoning, instead of through manual review. As shown in Fig. 
8, the linkage protection requirements are derived from ADDN 
and VicHealth policies. Once receiving the request for such 
linkage as Vic_ADDN, related patient EHRs are then extracted
from both databases (ADDN and VicHealth) with local 
anonymity schemes, ano_1 and ano_2. Here both ano_1 and 
ano_2 contain the quasi-identifiers and statistical requirements 
related to the two databases, i.e. QIADDN = {Gender, Ethnicity, 
Postcode}k=3 and QIVicHealth = {Age, Language, Postcode}k=2 for 
ADDN and VicHealth respectively. Through reasoning about 
semantic rules, the linkage anonymity scheme can guide the 
privacy preservation demands through the use of hasLinkageQI
as well as hasLinkageAnoReq.
In addition to anonymisation, the resultant tuples need to be
verified based on associations in case of inference risks.
Through analysing tuples (tuple1) against related RA instances
(RA1), Fig. 9 illustrates how the previous linkage releases affect 
the privacy verification via associations such as 2201-Greek → 
3205-Greek. Once a risky combination is detected, the strategy 
Generalisation is suggested to enforce the original value and 
antecedents, e.g. replacing 2201-Greek with 22-Greek given the 
RA1 learned from previous releases. As discussed, it is necessary 
to extend associations mined in the accumulative procedure and 
semantically it can be realised via using hasSubRA. For instance, 
based on tuple1 and tuple2 standing for two (linked) patient 
records after anonymisation, privacy verification is conducted 
twice: after testing 2201-Greek, it will continue with 22-Greek 
by searching for all subordinate RA cases, e.g. 22-Greek→3205-
Greek. Through reasoning on the Rule 9, another risky 
combination (SubRA1) can be detected and hence the original 
2201-Greek will be finally replaced with 2-Southern European 
Language in this example.
Figure 8. Semantic reasoning using anonymity scheme composition.
Figure 9. Resultant operations for linkage.
C. Result Analysis and Discussion
The experiments were performed on a laptop with Windows
10 operation system (3.20 GHz Intel Core processor and 8GB 
Memory). Anonymised records were produced using ARX, an 
open source anonymisation tool [48]. As the underpinning 
algorithm, Flash was used to explore optimal data utility [49]. 
After importing datasets and configuring the basic settings 
including k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, δ-Presence; data 
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dictionaries; k values as well as attribute weights4, the results 
show how basic privacy criteria are satisfied. 
1) Data Sources
Continuing with the collaborative scenario where 
researchers at ADDN apply to link patients with the survey 
respondents in the VicHealth dataset. To explore the method 
performance, we simulate ten linkage scenarios involving 10 
records, 20 records, …, 100 records by sampling ADDN 
individuals based on ORADDN-VicHealth from 1% to 10%. Selected 
individuals are assumed to be common individuals included in 
both ADDN and VicHealth. To reduce the impact of the value 
distribution, we shuffle all rows and then select the first 10, 
20, …, 100 records and construct the linkage sets. Before we 
consider anonymisation, it is necessary to explore the raw 
records in the linkage sets. As shown in Fig. 10, given security 
thresholds of 25%, 33.3% and 50% (corresponding to 4-
anonymity, 3-anonymity and 2-anonymity [50]), the proportions 
of data that fall into safe ranges increases when more common 
individuals are involved. In each cluster, we can find that the 
higher k value that is set, the fewer individuals satisfy the 
security constraint.
Figure 10. Qualified records in linkage groups.
2) Attribute Associations
To prevent privacy leakage from occurring in linkages, the 
contents of previous releases needs to be parsed and association 
rules used to check the privacy of current release requests. In 
this work, association mining was conducted using the Apriori 
algorithm on released linkages [32]. To show the association 
mining with different conditions, we focus on using full-chance5,
2-ary associations to protect the same linkage release over time 
(with 10, 50 and 100 records respectively). As the accumulative 
mining proceeds Language values, Fig. 11 shows how more 
associations can be discovered when privacy checking.
Specifically, 28 more association rules were added to the 
knowledge base through the multi-round processing on the 
group (n=50, k=3). With more sample records involved, the 
number of associations increases to 21, 24 and 35 rules mined 
from groups (n=10, k=2), (n=50, k=2) and (n=100, k=2) in the 
second round. Such value associations evaluated at different 
levels can avoid privacy breaches during dynamic linkages.
                                                          
4 Attribute weights can reflect the precedence of generalisation, i.e. ARX tries to 
reduce the modification on attributes with higher weights.
a) Accumulated rule number (k=2)
b) Accumulated rule number (k=3)
c) Accumulated rule number (k=4)
Figure 11. Association mining with {Language}hierarchical values.
In this work, the key is to protect linkage release from 
privacy breaches. Results may be specialised by association 
rules and thus lead to a higher re-identification chance -
potentially greater than 1/k. To show the potential risk without 
semantic privacy protection, we compare the average number of 
compromised records by assuming the anonymity requirements
can never decrease in the repeated releasing, i.e. there are 6 
groups with non-decreasing k sequences. As shown in Fig.12,
for a first-time value such as k=2, the higher k the more records 
need to be processed, e.g. 21 in group (k1=2, k2=2) and 26 with 
(k1=2, k2=3). This can be explained given the same associations 
mined from the previous release, hence it is easier to breach the 
security requirements since a larger equivalent group size is 
demanded. The requirement gap in the two-time release will also 
impact the protection efforts e.g. zero-gap groups (k1=2, k2=2), 
(k1=3, k2=3) and (k1=4, k2=4) have records at risk in less than 
one-gap groups (k1=2, k2=3) and (k1=3, k2=4). This reaches a 
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maximum (i.e. 31 records) in the group (k1=2, k2=4), which has 
the biggest gap.
Figure 12. Comparing the numbers of records at risk.
3) Average utility loss
For the useful privacy preservation, data should have high 
utility, hence the information loss caused by generalising values 
needs to be compared among different approaches. In this 
context, SSE/SST are used to measure how many details remain 
in the releases [27]. When dealing with categorical attributes, the 
original and aggregate values can be quantified by subtracting 
hierarchical levels [29] [30] [31]. More values to be transformed 
subsequently result in less utility. Specifically, data utility loss 
can be measured by (1). where xij is the original value of attribute 
j about individual i and x’ij refers to its protected form; m is the 
number of QI attributes in the linkage and the function 
level_Dis() denotes the structural distance between categorical 
















As shown in Fig. 13, after employing k-anonymity and 
linkage k-anonymity given different constraints and data sizes, 
we see how different degrees of utility loss can occur. In the 
cross-group comparison, as the data (linkage) size increases, 
there is an overall decline of the data to be changed for privacy-
preservation. Within each group (e.g. n=20) anonymised with 
the same algorithm (e.g. k-anonymity), a higher k value tends to 
cause higher levels of distortion, e.g. 16% with k=2 and 40%
with k=3. This can be explained by the relation between the 
privacy cost and the resultant data utility, i.e. stronger protection 
can normally cause greater data loss. 
Finally, for each scenario the benefit has been shown by 
using linkage k-anonymity. For instance, with the same 
constraint (e.g. k=2) in the 30-record group, the linkage 2-
anonymity only results in 5.83% of modifications to records for 
nearly half of the 2-anonymity (11%). Furthermore, the gap 
between the two methods becomes more obvious when using a 
higher constraint, e.g. 5.83% vs 23% with k=3 and 7.71% vs 33%
with k=4. Such results demonstrate an increased impact on data 
utility by setting the statistical models accordingly. As discussed,
linkage k-anonymity has the potential to cause privacy issues 
through on-going releases. In addition to comparing 
compromised records, we explore the extra costs in using SLKA 
to avoid such risk disclosures. Different from the comparison 
between k-anonymity and linkage k-anonymity in static 
scenarios, protection here assumes an iterative (repeated) 
linkage release process, i.e. the same linkage scheme is used 
whilst the local policies are allowed to change. Continuing with 
the example where {Language} is changed from a NQI to a QI
attribute in the linkage set, after mining the association rules, the 
resultant values must be processed through reasoning using the 
Rules 8-9, i.e. conditionals in associations will be generalised 
from the tuple until all records satisfy the policy constraint. As 
shown in Fig. 14, the average information loss shows the extra 
cost in SLKA in dealing with risky individuals. As with the last 
comparison, k values can affect the level of distortion from 11.5%
(k=2) vs 12.9% (k=3). Compared with linkage k-anonymity,
using SLKA for each group leads to additional loss after the 
privacy checks from 13.7% vs 5.90% (k=4).
Figure 13. Information loss with k-anonymity and linkage k-anonymity.
Figure 14. Average information loss with k-anonymity, linkage k-anonymity 
and semantic linkage k-anonymity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a privacypreserving linkage 
framework by extending weak k-anonymity algorithms with 
linkage features and semantic reasoning capabilities. Based on 
the properties of EHR linkage infrastructures, we provide an 
example of distributed, data-driven applications with dynamic 
security demands. In addition to balancing data privacy and 
utility, adding reasoning capabilities helps to adjust the 
composite scheme with any changes that occur when performing 
linkage. The approach is demonstrated using a linkage scenario 
where researchers apply to link data from an Australia-wide 
national type-1 diabetes platform with survey results from 
25,000+ Victorians based on their health and wellbeing. With 
the focus of identity protection, three privacy-preserving 
approaches were analysed using practical metrics. The findings 
showed the efficiency of linkage units and could help to 
minimise the need for manual review of linkage results before 





(2,2) (2,3) (2,4) (3,3) (3,4) (4,4)









n=10 n=20 n=30 n=40 n=50 n=60 n=70 n=80 n=90 n=100
Information Loss
2-anonymity KA 2-anonymity LKA 3-anonymity KA















It is noted that we are not proposing to entirely replace 
linkage k-anonymity or k-anonymity with SLKA, but rather to 
have the method available when conditions are satisfied. The 
adoption criteria of such approaches may vary from case to case, 
depending on factors such as the acceptable overlapping rate, 
dataset sizes, attribute numbers and value hierarchies. We have 
shown that semantic verification against implicit associations 
through SLKA maintains aggregate values and thus avoids the 
excessive data obfuscation that occurs whilst protecting against 
individual re-identification risks. The SLKA framework 
provides dynamic protection for repeated linkage releases while 
preserving data utility by avoiding unnecessary generalisation as 
typified by k-anonymity.
Several future research topics are identified based on this 
work. First, we have identified that the overlapping rate should
affect the method selection, therefore there is a need for diverse 
sample-based tests to justify and refine the metrics, i.e. 
considering how many attributes and records to use without 
knowing of the presence of an individual. Second, it would be 
interesting to consider circumstances where different minimal 
support and confidence values were applied for association 
mining. In this work, we only consider full-chance associations,
however, other possibilities may also be explored. Third, we 
explored SLKA with two data-sets but different datasets may 
have distinct demands not represented in this example. For this 
reason, it is essential to continue the experiments on different 
types of datasets with a wide range of privacy requirements and 
data demands.
Even with the potential of semantic-based reasoning which 
can require extra generalisation and hence information loss, the
acceptance of solutions put forward in this paper will take time 
to be adopted due to the risk aversion of many health 
organisations.
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